Belarus, Construction, Energy, EU – Baltic States, Lithuania, Nuclear power plant
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Saturday, 20.04.2024, 17:46
IAEA official: Belarus' N-plant is a serious project
IAEA Deputy Director General Juan Carlos Lentijo,
on a visit to Lithuania, says that the agency did not review the site selection
process during its Site and External Events Design (SEED) mission to Belarus in
January because it had not been asked to by the host country.
"We have our assistance services also through peer
reviews or, let's say, assistance evaluations, etc. But it is up to the member
states to request. We don't have the means to push or request that the country
request our services. We are ready to provide our services," he said.
Lentijo, who heads the agency's Department of Nuclear Safety
and Security, thinks that Belarus should step up cooperation with Lithuania to
show the neighboring country that it is ready to ensure nuclear safety.
Commenting on Belarus' unwillingness to inform its neighbors about incidents on
the Astravyets construction site, the director general noted that these had not
been nuclear safety events, but added that the agency nevertheless encouraged
countries to report such events.
The IAEA experts said during the SEED mission in mid-January
that Belarus had taken proper account of external hazards to the Astravyets
nuclear power plant construction site. The Lithuanian government said that the
mission had not covered the site selection criteria, seismic surveys and
environmental impact.
I would like to ask
you about the seed mission in Belarus. Is the atomic energy agency sure that the
nuclear power plant will be safe?
Juan Carlos Lentijo: Well, let me highlight
that nuclear safety is national responsibility of the country using nuclear
technologies. What we know in the case of the Belarusian nuclear power plant is
that Belarus has a history of cooperation with the agency. They are used to
requesting our services and in particular the last one that you mentioned was the
SEED mission that was focused on a specific part of the project. That means
that it is the national authorities who could really respond to this
question.
There are different opinions. At least Lithuania is not confident that the Belarusian nuclear power plant will be safe and there is criticism toward the seed mission. Lithuania says that only two out of six modules were covered during the mission. So how many modules were actually covered?
J.C.Lentijo: The agency offers SEED missions in a
modular way. That means that there are several modules that are adapted to
specific cases and SEED missions are as any other mission deployed under the
request of member states. It is up to the requesting or the host country to
select the modules that in its consideration better fit the specific stage of
the project. In this particular case, what Belarusians selected where those
modules that are related to the accuracy of the Belarusian nuclear power plant,
with the current status of construction. (...)
These were focused mainly on the external hazards
assessment, in particular the cover flight areas, the characterization of
the site, how they characterized site hazards; secondly, how they are
screening the site's hazards to determine what are the relevant ones for the plant.
The third area that was covered was in relation to the design. How the design
took into consideration these screened hazards, then monitoring, because in
nuclear power plants, an external hazard needs to be monitored along the life
of the facility.
And, finally, the SEED also covered some specific challenges
that were highlighted in our report on the Fukushima accident. Having said
that, I think that the main preliminary conclusion of the SEED team -- I
insist that it is preliminary, because the report is not yet finished and is
currently under preparation by the team -- but the preliminary findings
indicate that the Belarusian nuclear power plant's design is considering what
they have screened as external hazards.
Speaking about the
power plant's site. Lithuania says that review needs to be done on the site
selection process. It wasn't done in the seed mission, was it?
J.C. Lentijo: It
did not cover the site selection. As I mentioned before, our SEED missions are
modular and it is up to member states requesting the service to select the
modules. (...) And I assume that Belarusians made a decision to request this
mission just to be sure that the main hazards from the side were appropriately
considered by the design.
In your experience, do
member states usually request a site review?
J.C. Lentijo:
Well, there are several international instruments to promote the consultation
process or the cooperation process in this area. And it is not for the agency
to evaluate specific cases.
As far as i
understand, the agency's experts cannot request information from the state if
it is not asking for experts' assessment in specific areas?
J.C.Lentijo: I
insist that nuclear safety is a responsibility of its country. The agency can
and plays a role to support, to assist the member states through several
instruments. One of these is our safety standards that are available to them.
(...) And we have our assistance services also through peer reviews or, let's
say, assistance evaluations, etc. But it is up to the member states to request.
We don't have the means to push or request that the country request our
services. We are ready to provide our services.
I would like to ask
you what can be done if a state ignores safety standards.
J.C.Lentijo:
Firstly, safety standards are not mandatory for any states. The safety
standards are only mandatory for the agency, for our own activities and also
they are, as I mentioned before, the documents that we use to benchmark the
national systems when we are requested to contact an assistance service or
review service, etc. But having said that, there are several international
instruments that member states use to demonstrate their commitment to safety.
For example, there is the convention on nuclear safety or the joint convention
on the safe management of fuel or safe management of waste. And through these
instruments countries exchange information on their national experience
regarding nuclear safety. I think that these are major instruments that
countries have at hand to prove their commitment to safety.
The agency usually encourages all member states to conduct
the programs in cooperation with international community, including the agency,
neighboring countries, other countries, and, of course, we have this role to
encourage, to facilitate international cooperation. (...) But it is obvious
that mechanisms they have at hand to express the real commitment to nuclear
safety at the international level are the conventions. And, of course, another
relevant instrument, as I mentioned before, is for them to use our services.
For example, in Belarus, after the SEED mission, we have only the preliminary
conclusions and the report is currently under development, under final
preparation. As far as I know, the government of Belarus is committed to publish
this report, to make this report public. That will help other countries,
including Lithuania, to know more about the conclusions of this independent
mission, about independent peer review missions. And to make their own opinion
on the situation.
One of the challenges
for Lithuania is that for Vilnius, because the Belarusian power plant is around
50 kilometers away. In your view, what should be done in Lithuania to make sure
that Vilnius is as safe as possible if the worst case scenario happens?
J.C.Lentijo: It
is important that cooperation between or among different countries is
strengthened. And I think it is very important for neighboring countries --
Belarus or any other country operating nuclear facilities -- to establish close
cooperation with the neighbors. And it is important for the neighbors to
establish channels to facilitate the getting of information that is relevant
for protecting their own citizens. I think that, in the end, as I mentioned
before, nuclear safety is national responsibility both for countries operating
the nuclear power plant, but also for countries next to its borders. (...) The
agency is promoting close cooperation, close consultation between countries to
facilitate this exchange of information, which is relevant to determine what
kind of plans you should develop in Lithuania, for example, to be sure that if
something happens, you can deploy an emergency response that is sufficient to
protect the Lithuanian population.
Cooperation between
the countries is, i'd say, weak, at least at the moment, because there were
some accidents on the construction site -- a reactor shell fell, other things
happened -- and Belarus did not notify other countries and it was only after
the media uncovered these accidents that they published this information. This
doesn't encourage Lithuania to believe that everything will be ok with
communication.
J.C.Lentijo:
There are many elements in that issue, because, initially, we should start by
saying that the construction site in Belarus is not yet a nuclear facility;
it's a construction site; there is no nuclear material there. We have several
international systems to facilitate the communication of events that could be
relevant for nuclear safety with the idea to exchange this information with other
countries and to facilitate the dissemination of lessons that could be learned
from these.
The events that you mentioned occurred on a site under
construction; from this point of view, there is not anything touching upon a
nuclear safety event. But we are trying to encourage the community to
communicate even this kind of events as a way to enhance trustability, to
enhance, to facilitate the process between or among different countries. And
beyond that, we consider that these kind of events could be also relevant not
only for neighboring countries, but even for other countries that are currently
building their nuclear power plants; they could have a very good experience and
don't repeat the same event in their projects.
The agency promotes the exchange of this information. I
don't know what specific elements under communication between Lithuania and
Belarus on the events occurring in the construction site phase are. Belarus
communicated to the agency several of these events, but it was not under the
umbrella of the current reporting system which is specifically deployed for
nuclear power plants under operation or when there is nuclear fuel there.
Will you come to
Vilnius after the Belarusian nuclear power plant starts working?
J.C. Lentijo: Why
not? I was at the construction site last year; my perception was that it is a
serious project. (...) I don't see any reason for not visiting the Belarusian
nuclear power plant in the future while I am visiting many others in the
world.