Analytics, Ecology, Education and Science, Energy, Legislation

Climate Change and Climate Policy

Udo E. Simonis.

At this point in time, we are roughly five years after the publication of the 30-Year Update of “Limits to Growth” (Meadows et al. 2004), three and a half years after the presentation of the “Stern Report” (Stern et al. 2006), three  years after the presentation of the “4th Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” (IPCC 2007). And we have just passed the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP-15) in Copenhagen (December, 2009), which unfortunately did not bring about a major breakthrough on rules, targets and measures for the time after 2012, when the current international treaty on climate policy – the “Kyoto Protocol” – will have ended. 

 

Meadows et al. made it clear that climate change depicts one of the limits the world has already overshot; Stern et al. presented a comprehensive estimation of the economic costs of climate change; the IPCC reported on the scope of climate change, the impacts and vulnerabilities, and on the policies that can or should be used to adapt to climate change and to prevent further dangerous climate change. The special focus of this article is on mitigation and adaptation at the urban level, as this could be of strategic political importance, in Europe as a whole and in the Baltic States, in particular.      

Climate Change: The Physical Science Basis

The 3rd IPCC Assessment Report (2001) already set the tone, and the 4th Report of 2007 strengthened it with a “very high confidence” that “warming of the climate system is unequivocal”. 

 

The updated 100-year linear trend (1906-2005) is at plus 0.74 °C. The warming trend over the last 50 years is nearly twice that of the last 100 years. At continental, regional, and ocean-basin scales, specific long-term changes in climate have been observed. These include changes in Arctic temperatures and ice, widespread changes in precipitation amounts, ocean salinity, wind patterns and aspects of extreme weather, including droughts, heavy precipitation, heat waves and the intensity of tropical cyclones, of typhoons and hurricanes. Changes in the atmospheric abundance of greenhouse gases and aerosols, in solar radiation and in land surface properties alter the energy balance of the climate system.  

 

The 2007 IPCC report says that by far the largest part of global warming is (‘very likely’) caused by human activities, particularly by the emission of various greenhouse gases. Carbon dioxide (CO₂) is the most important greenhouse gas. Its global atmospheric concentration has increased from a pre-industrial value of about 280 ppm (parts per million) to 379 ppm in 2005. This exceeds by far the natural range over the last 650.000 years, as determined from ice cores. 

 

The increased atmospheric concentration of CO₂ results primarily from fossil fuel use, with land use change providing another significant but smaller contribution. Between 2000 and 2005, annual fossil fuel carbon dioxide emissions have increased to 26,4 Gigatons, while emissions associated with land-use change (especially agriculture and deforestation) were in the order of 5,9 Gt CO₂.  In 2009, the combined burden on the climate system was estimated at about 36,0 Gt CO₂.

 

Analysis of climate models together with evidence from observations enables an assessed range to be given to “climate sensitivity”. It is here, where the specific IPCC scenario methodology comes in. Model simulations cover a certain range of possible futures, including idealised greenhouse gas emission and/or concentration assumptions. The IPCC presents six such scenarios: three scenarios of category A1 – i.e., the fossil-intensive A1FI, the non-fossil energy sources A1T, and a balance across all sources A1B – and the scenarios A2, B1 and B2 – corresponding to CO₂ equivalent concentrations of 600, 700, 800, 850, 1250 and 1550 ppm, respectively.  

 

Simulation results: Depending upon the scenario chosen (see Figure 1), the range of additional global warming up to the year 2100 (over 2000) is between 1.1 and 6.4 °C. 

 

Figure 1: Global averages of surface warming (relative to 1980-1999) for scenarios A2, A1B and B1

Source: IPCC, 2007.   

 

The best estimate for the low scenario (B1) is 1.8 °C (likely range is 1.1 – 2.9 °C). This scenario describes a world with still increasing population that, however, peaks in the mid-century and declines thereafter, with rapid change in the established economic structures, with reductions in material intensity, with large-scale introduction of clean and resource efficient technologies, and with a stop to forest losses. 

 

The best estimate for the high scenario (A1FI) is 4.0 °C (likely range is 2.4 – 6.4 °C). This scenario describes a world of rapid economic growth, where no major structural economic change occurs and where the path of relying primarily on fossil fuels is not really being abandoned.  

 

Climate Change: Impacts and Vulnerabilities

Regarding the foreseeable impacts of climate change, the IPCC addresses a cascade of impacts and presents them in two major ways: with a view on sectors and a view on regions.     

 

The perception of IPCC on sectoral  impacts however is somewhat limited. It includes agriculture, forestry and ecosystems, water, human health, and the whole complex of industry, settlements and society, but is not looking at housing stock, built-up areas and urbanisation, categories architects and urban planners would particularly be interested in. The regional impacts of climate change found greater attention of the IPCC, in that the perspectives of the greater regions of the world, the Americas, Africa, Europe, Asia, the Polar Regions, and the Small Islands States were specified.        

 

A first general conclusion from these observations on the impacts of climate change and sectoral and regional vulnerabilities would be, that both greenhouse gas emission reductions (mitigation) and actions to adapt to climate change (adaptation) are needed. However, the vulnerable sectors and regions vary widely. Accordingly, some ideas on the costs of climate change and the strategic measures of climate policy would be welcome.    

Climate Change: Costs and Policy Measures

With great vigour and expertise, Sir Nicholas Stern and colleagues tried to answer two major questions: what impacts will future greenhouse gas emissions have and what will they cost; what are the costs and benefits of measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases? (Stern Report, 2006).

 

No doubt, monetary evaluations of heterogeneous and long-term changes are compound with a number of methodological and ethical questions. For instance, how to evaluate the increased number of deaths and injuries when addressing climate change? What are the costs and benefits today, compared with those in the year 2100? The discount-rate plays a major role to determine such estimations. 

 

The Stern Report’s results can be summarised shortly in the following way: 

 

1. The “pure economic costs” of climate change will be equivalent to losing at least 5 % of global gross domestic product (GDP);   

2. If taking into account the impacts on ecosystems and human health, the damage would lead to a dimension of 11 %. 

3. Considering additionally possible feedbacks and regional transfers due to differing impacts, the estimates of damage rise to 20 % of global GDP, or even more.   

 

The costs of an unrestrained climate change, i.e. non-action, thus may be on a scale of 5 to 20 % of the gross global product.

 

The alternative to such huge damages of climate change are the costs of action, i.e. those measures with which the emission of greenhouse gases could be reduced to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. Stern et al. discuss four major groups of policy measures: 

 

 –  Reducing demand for energy-intensive products and services;

 –  Drastic increase of energy efficiency;

 –  Curbing deforestation; and

 –  Transition from fossil to non-fossil energy sources. 

 

Stern’s team found that the costs of action for stabilising CO₂-concentration in the atmosphere at 500-550 ppm were centered on 1 % of global GDP by 2050 (in a later update, this figure however has been increased). 

 

Two major conclusions can be drawn from this: the costs of action for an effective climate policy are much less than the costs of non-action. And, the later a strong climate policy is enacted, the more costly it will become.  

 

These elements of the Stern Report already indicate that effective climate policy needs strong collective action and should start as early as possible. With this understanding, we have reached the point at looking at the “Kyoto Protocol” – and beyond.   

Climate Policy: From Kyoto I to Kyoto II

The “Kyoto Protocol” of 1997, which came into force in 2005, is so far the only implementation agreement under the UN-Framework Convention on Climate Change. It will end with the year 2012. Therefore, it’s high time to negotiate Kyoto II (and to reflect on Kyoto III).   

 

To start with, the Kyoto Protocol is an extremely important treaty under international law, addressing the reduction of six specified greenhouse gases. I personally think, there is no real alternative to a multi-lateral approach of climate policy, as climate is a truly global public good. No doubt also, the Kyoto Protocol contains highly innovative economic mechanisms, namely Joint Implementation (JI), Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Emissions Trading (ET). At the same time, however, it is, in its present form, a rather weak agreement.

  

There are three major reasons behind this judgement: (1) The target is not very ambitious; (2) not enough actors (states) have been incorporated; (3) the sanctions against misbehaviour are insufficient. 

 

Between signing of the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and its coming into force (2005), some structural deficits have been overcome, but only partly so. There still is no adequate balance between incentives on the one hand and sanctions on the other, i.e. between “the carrot and the stick”.

 

Truly, the CDM mechanism which is operating since about four years, has led to the installation of more than 1.200 emission reduction projects between industrial and developing countries, with a potential for emission reduction of some 1.5 Gigatons of CO₂ or more until the year 2012. The JI-mechanism has an estimated reduction potential of several hundred million tons. And the potential of the ET-mechanism of cap & trade is theoretically enormous, depending on strict, politically set emission limits (the caps) and on the actual price of emission certificates traded – which in practice can be high or low. 

 

Several small climate funds have been established in recent years. They may be sufficient to cover information and communication costs of climate change, but for globally effective mitigation and adaptation strategies they are absolutely insufficient, as these may require annual financial resources of $100 bln and more. 

 

The mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol therefore need re-adjustment. The CDM had nearly no effect in Africa, but was booming in China. The JI needs an “efficiency philosophy”, which so far does not exist in all of the countries involved. The ET-mechanism established in the European Union (EU) was poorly conceptualised, and there is none yet in the regions of Northern America, Eastern Asia and the rest of the world. 

 

This said, we have already touched the essentials for a new global climate regime: (1) the targets must be heightened; (2) the number of actors enlarged; (3) the mechanisms augmented; (4) the sanctions tightened, and (5) the incentives amplified. 

 

In this context, the important question is whether a consensus can be reached on concrete targets, timetables, burden sharing – on justice and fairness in the greenhouse. Early in the process, the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) proposed to set a strict upper limit of 2°C of temperature increase (which corresponds to a CO₂-concentration in the atmosphere of about 450 ppm). European institutions joined the initiative and with the “Copenhagen Accord” (December 2009) there is now at least a broad consensus on the overarching goal among the international community. The basic rationale of this proposal is that a global average warming of above 2°C would be truly dangerous – for all living organisms, including humans.    

Double Strategy: Decarbonisation and Dematerialisation

Seen physically, the Kyoto Protocol is on decarbonisation, more precisely: on formulating and implementing certain international decarbonisation standards. The Earth system, however, is not only threatened by CO₂-emissions and other greenhouse gases. The industrial metabolism as such is exorbitantly high, particularly material throughput; and with it the “ecological  rucksack”.  The CO₂ burden of the average European, for example, is about 9 tons per year, but total material throughput (TMT) is nearly 70 tons per year.

 

Therefore, a double strategy seems appropriate: mitigation via “low emission technology” should be supplemented by mitigation via “resource-light economy”. Besides decarbonisation, dematerialisation of industrial society is asked for – or, as a proverb says: “Less horsepower, more IQ!” 

 

In this context, several strategic technological mechanisms or mitigation portfolios come into picture, especially: 

 

-  the three E’s: Energy Saving; Energy Efficiency; Renewable Energies;

-  the three R’s: Reduce; Re-use; Recycle;

-  the big S: CO2-Sequestration; and

-  the basic IE: Industrial Ecology. 

 

Quite a few states (and many politicians) that mistrust or even refuse multi-lateral approaches to climate change and international law – and with it the Kyoto Protocol – play the “technology card”, proposing so called lighthouse projects – like hydrogen economy, carbon capture and storage (CCS), or large-scale renewable energy (like Desertec). An offer could be made to these actors and interest groups, especially when in this way a dynamic international cooperation on climate technology would emerge. 

 

Basically, the UN-Framework Convention on Climate Change sets no limit to the number of implementation protocols. In addition to the  market oriented Kyoto protocol, a technology protocol could also be conceptualised under the convention. With such a “double strategy” – enhancing the Kyoto Protocol and additionally formulating a Technology Protocol – two aims could be achieved simultaneously: getting in the so far opposing parties (states and politicians) of a strong climate policy, and making national “free-riders” accountable for international action. 

Climate Policy: Mitigation and/or Adaptation?

One of the major questions in climate policy is mitigation and/or adaptation. Should we invest billions (of Dollars, Euros etc.) in climate protection measures or wouldn’t it be easier and more rational to simply adjust to a warming world? Here, the answer of most of the experts is straightforward: mitigation or adaptation is a specious argument; we need both – mitigation and adaptation are imperative!

 

The reason for such argumentation is rather simple. Even a successful climate policy will not prevent climate from changing. Due to the long-term dynamics of the climate system, it seems quite impossible to stop global warming below an average increase of 2°C. The real challenge therefore should read as was suggested by John Schellnhuber: “Managing the unavoidable, avoiding the unmanageable!”

 

Though mitigation and adaptation in actual fact are two sides of a coin, there are a number of distinctions to be made. Adaptation implies that individual actors, i.e. people, communities, regions, and states can and will pursue their own specific strategies. The Dutch, for instance, will heighten the dikes; the farmer will switch to alternative farm produce, the urban dweller will close the windows against the heat, i.e. adaptation will occur based on self-interest on various levels. Regarding mitigation, by contrast, we are all in the same boat – in “Space-ship Earth”. Every attempt for mitigation, installing more efficient energy and transport modes, planting trees, or riding bicycles will not only benefit the individual doing it, but the world at large. It is this systemic global effect of mitigation that requires better global understanding and enhanced international cooperation. But precisely that need for information and cooperation makes the negotiations on a new global climate regime so complicated and tiresome.

 

There is still another distinction to be made regarding the two strategies. Adaptation in the short term is less expensive but in the long term gets more and more expensive. Successfully adapting to a warming of 2°C in a short period of time is a real challenge – and we do not know whether it will be achieved. But if global warming turns up to be in the range of 4°C or more, successful adaptation will get very unlikely. With mitigation, it’s the other way round: greening and cleaning energy, transport, and housing first seems to be expensive, but in actual fact it’s a contribution to long-term sustainability.

 

Therefore, my general conclusions regarding the controversy on climate strategies are twofold: Adaptation is necessary but cannot go on cost of mitigation; mitigation may be costly, but not protecting climate will be priceless.  

Climate Policy: Urban Mitigation and Adaptation

Urban areas, cities and towns, are main drivers of climate change, and they are driven by climate change. It has been estimated that up to 80 % of the global fossil fuel carbon dioxide emissions originate in urban areas. In  Europe, cities and towns account for nearly 70 % of the continent’s energy use and thus for most greenhouse gas emissions. But valid long-term data on that “urban climate burden” are scarce or even non-existing.  

 

As was said above, the IPCC did not focus on urban areas but was looking at different sectoral categories. The economic mitigation potentials by sector in 2030 were estimated on the assumption of a price of  <20 to <100 US dollars per ton of CO₂-ecquivalent emissions, leading  to the following range in results:

Buildings account for 5.3 – 6.7 Gigatons; Industry 2.5 – 5.5; Energy supply 2.4 – 4.7; Transport 1.6 – 2.5; Waste 0.4 – 1.0; Agriculture 2.3 – 6.4; Forestry 1.3 – 4.2.

 

Supposing that the first five categories are predominantly urban, these figures give a rough approximation of the importance of urban mitigation.  It has to be noted however that these are estimates, using technologies and practices expected to be available in 2030, not including non-technical options such as lifestyle changes. And it has to be recalled that mitigation is understood as being a function of the price per ton of greenhouse gas emissions.  

 

The IPCC, in great detail, gives examples of key mitigation technologies, policies and measures, and also examples of key constraints and opportunities – and thereby differentiates between technologies and practices currently available and those projected to be commercialised before 2030. It would be interesting to look at those examples from a planner’s point of view to find out what has been seen by the authors and what was forgotten.  This however is not possible here. Instead, I would like to pick up some examples which I myself find interesting from the perspective of possible “urban frontrunners”.

 

A couple of cities have started as pioneers of change and provide elements of best practice for urban mitigation and adaptation: Barcelona is committed to become a leader in solar energy use; Swedish cities are being based on biomass power; London is setting ambitious greenhouse gas reduction targets; the EU Commission is cooperating vertically with hundreds of cities:

 

-  Barcelona’s Plan for Energy Improvement is increasing the use of renewable energy. Promotion policies, demonstration projects, legal and management instruments are in place. Its Solar Thermal Ordinances have been adapted by other municipalities and have been input to the new Spanish building code.

-  Västra Hamnen, a low carbon residential district of the city of Malmö, is based on renewable energy on an annual cycle, i.e. the district at certain times of the year is borrowing energy from the city, while at others supplies the city with its surplus.

-  Växjö in Sweden was given the title of the “the greenest city in Europe”. In 2008, the CO₂ emissions per capita were down to 3 tons, a decrease of 35 % over the last 15 years; at the end of 2010 they are expected to be 50 % and in 2025 70 % lower than in the base year 1993. At the end of 2009, nearly all Swedish cities did have biomass power plants.

-  Jühnde, a commune in Germany has fully switched to renewable energies and zero emissions, and has become a place of pilgrimage to all sorts of planners. Hundreds of towns and villages are now planning to follow this example.

-  The London Climate Change Action Plan aims to stabilise CO₂ emissions in 2025 at 60 % below 1990 levels.

-  The “Convenant of Mayors Initiative” of the European Commission involves nearly 800 cities from all over Europe to formally commit to reduce their CO₂ emissions by 20 % or more by the year 2020. To do so, they have to implement energy action plans and communicate on the measures with local stakeholders.

-  Finally, two other interesting initiatives, first, the “Solarbundesliga” (www.solarbundesliga.de), i.e. an online ranking of the installed solar energy capacity of 1.500 large, medium and small towns in Germany, and second, the “Renewable Energy Sources Champions League” (www.res-league.eu) on the EU-level, where five Czech communes rank at the top of a European wood ranking (installed wood energy capacity). 

 

While these and many other mitigation plans and activities are proceeding, in strategic adaptation, i.e. in concerted adaptation programs and activities, we have seen much less progress to date. One reason being, that contrary to mitigation engineering approaches are only part of the solution here.

 

Adaptation calls for a more fundamental rethinking of urban design and management and needs to be integrated into various other policies. Still, several impressive and sometimes exotic initiatives have been undertaken, for instance:

 

-  Planning new urban settlements outside conventional areas, in the form of floating houses.

-  Using ventilation and cooling systems in public spaces and buildings, such as solar shading.

-  Greening cities with walls and roofs.

-  Installing pocket parks which help cool the city on hot days and absorb rain on wet days.

-  In preparation is a World Congress on Cities and Adaptation in May 2010 in Bonn under the imaginative title: “Resilient cities”.

 

These and other adaptation activities have been suggested in the EU Green Paper (2007) on “Adapting to Climate Change in Europe”, and the  respective White Paper (2008), which provide valuable information for the development of national and local adaptation plans in the EU member countries.

 

Apart from such small-scale projects there are also some “grand designs” of geo-engineering being discussed, like the one by the Nobel Prize winner, and now US energy minister Steven Chu, who was proposing a worldwide “whitening” of human settlements in order to reflect direct sunlight.

 

I would like to conclude by suggesting that both urban mitigation of climate change and urban adaptation to climate change need further improvement in the exchange of information, experience and best practice among the cities of the world. 

Literature & References:

European Commission (EC):  Adaptation to Climate Change in Europe, Green Paper 2007; White Paper 2008.

European Environmental Agency (EEA): Europe’s Environment. The  Fourth Assessment, Copenhagen 2007.

German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU): New Impetus for Climate Policy, Berlin 2007. 

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): Climate Change 2001, Cambridge 2001. 

IPCC (Working Group I): Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, Geneva 2007. 

IPCC (Working Group II): Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Geneva 2007. 

IPCC (Working Group III): Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change, Geneva 2007. 

IPCC: Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Geneva 2008.

Meadows, Donella, Jorgen Randers & Dennis Meadows: Limits to Growth. The 30-Year Update, White River Junction, VT. 2004. 

Mega-Stress for Mega-Cities. A Climate Vulnerability Ranking of Major Coastal Cities in Asia. WWF Report, Gland 2009.

Roaf, Susan et al.: Adapting Buildings and Cities for Climate Change. A 21st Century Survival Guide. 2nd edition, Princeton 2009.    

Stern, Nicholas et al.: The Economics of Climate Change, London 2006.